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END-OF-LIFE CARE: 
DOCTORS’ COMPLAINTS AND LEGAL RESTRAINTS 
ROBERT SCHWARTZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
In her thoughtful paper, Professor Johnson reviews how governments have 
attempted to use law to create a medical culture and patterns of medical 
practice that will serve the health of the public.1  Professor Johnson describes 
just how those efforts have succeeded—and how they have failed—in areas as 
diverse as medical liability, informed consent, medical billing practices, the 
prescription of narcotic pain medication, and the care of nursing home 
patients.2  She suggests that we often use the law to encourage providers (and 
especially doctors, who ultimately control all other providers) to do the right 
thing, and how doctors frequently respond to these legal incentives with 
complaints about how these incentives work in unexpected and perverse ways 
that undermine their original goals.3  Finally, Professor Johnson recommends 
that we ought to take those doctors’ complaints seriously, even if we are 
appropriately skeptical that they are based on a misunderstanding of the law or 
self-interest of one form or another, because they can serve as sentinel events 
that will lead us to appropriate reconsideration of the underlying legal 
mechanisms.4 
As Professor Johnson points out, physicians have a uniquely important 
perspective that makes their views particularly valuable to policymakers, even 
if their views are not always neutral or accurate.5  Doctors are uniquely able to 
describe how doctors react to laws that intend to regulate them, even if (maybe 
especially if) those doctors’ reactions to the law are unpredictable or even 
irrational.  When physicians, as a body, respond to new law by misreading or 
misunderstanding it, the rest of us ought to be sensitive to just why they are 
 
* Weihofen Professor of Law and Professor of Pediatrics, University of New Mexico. 
 1. Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims 
Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973 (2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 974–75. 
 4. Id. at 1031–32. 
 5. See id. at 976–79. 
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acting as they are.  We may not ultimately accept the doctors’ concerns at face 
value—those concerns may be the result of misunderstanding or self interest—
but the very fact that doctors react as they do is relevant if we evaluate the law 
in terms of the incentives it provides to health care providers.  Ultimately, we 
may not buy the provider’s arguments on what a law means or how it should 
be applied, but the medical culture may still be more affected by the 
physician’s perceptions of a legal requirement than it is by the actual 
requirement.  The misunderstanding itself may provide us with data that are 
fundamental to understanding why the law is not working as the lawmakers 
expected it to work and what must be done to change the law to achieve its 
original goals. 
Health lawyers and policymakers cannot always see the same shadows of 
the laws that are visible to health care providers, and sometimes those shadows 
have penumbras and emanations6 that are not visible to those outside of a 
narrow medical practice.  Sometimes those shadows, whether real or imagined, 
cause doctors to act inconsistently with the intent of the law, and inconsistently 
with the requirements of good medical practice.  Doctors may misread or 
misunderstand a law.  Still, if the law as misread or misunderstood actually 
affects medical practice, we should not be blind to the fact of the 
misunderstanding.  Listen to doctors’ criticism of the law skeptically, Professor 
Johnson says, and we will know how to create better, more effective laws to 
serve the public’s health.7 
In fact, Professor Johnson’s thesis, which she has demonstrated in a host of 
ways, is particularly well-demonstrated in the way the law has developed with 
regard to end-of-life care.8  What doctors perceive to be bad law may give rise 
to bad medical practice.  This bad practice gives rise to doctors’ complaints, 
which have given rise to new law designed to correct the perverse incentives in 
the earlier law.  The legal response, though, has sometimes created incentives 
for other forms of bad practice, which then give rise to new complaints, and 
then a new generation of legal reform.  The new generation of legal reform, 
whether “properly” understood or misunderstood, will give rise to yet another 
set of doctors’ complaints, new law, and yet another generation of imperfect 
incentives for those providing end-of-life care.  Doctors have not always 
properly understood the development of the law in this area, and they have not 
always adhered to the new generation of law.  Still, their comments and 
 
 6. The “penumbras” and “emanations” of the Bill of Rights were famously described by 
Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  Just as there are 
uncertainties about the meaning of constitutional law, there are uncertainties around the 
interpretation of statutes—especially those drafted to address public policy debates like that 
around end-of-life care. 
 7. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1031–32. 
 8. See id. at 981–84. 
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complaints about existing law have contributed to new and arguably more 
effective law. 
The move from the recognition of “brain death”9 to the original living will 
and “Right to Die” statutes, to the more sophisticated advance directive 
statutes that recognized durable powers of attorney,10 to the Patient Self-
Determination Act;11 and the development of pain relief statutes,12 physician-
assisted death statutes,13 the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act,14 and the new 
California Right-to-Know End-of-Life Options Act of 2008,15 have all been 
powered, in great part, by doctors’ complaints about incentives created by the 
effects of then-current end-of-life law.  Doctors have misunderstood much of 
this legislation, sometimes willfully, and they have ignored other parts of this 
law.  Still, the law has created increasingly appropriate incentives by listening 
to the complaints of those doctors—even when those complaints are not really 
justified. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE CARE 
At least from the turn of the twentieth century over a hundred years ago, 
American doctors have been enmeshed in a medical culture in which death is 
the enemy and the preservation of life, in any form, constitutes a victory over 
this enemy.16  American medicine was committed to using all of the resources 
available to save lives.  The failure to do so was inconsistent with the 
expectations of medicine, and, implicitly, inconsistent with the legal 
requirement that governed the practice of medicine.  Doctors would be acting 
inconsistently with both tort and criminal laws if they allowed patients who 
could be saved to die. 
 
 9. For a good history of the earliest discussion of “brain death,” see Alexander Morgan 
Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death: 
An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (1972).  See also supra notes 17–20 and 
accompanying text. 
 10. For a brief evaluation of the development of this law, see BARRY FURROW ET AL., 
BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 287–301 (6th ed. 2008). 
 11. The Patient Self-Determination Act was passed as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to 
-206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a (2006)) [hereinafter The Patient 
Self-Determination Act]. 
 12. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1015–16 & 1016 n.223. 
 13. The first such statute to be adopted was the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 127.800–.995 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009). 
 14. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1–19, 9 U.L.A. 83–129 (2005 & Supp. 2008). 
 15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442 (West Supp. 2009). 
 16. See generally Robert A. Burt, Doctors vs. Lawyers: The Perils of Perfectionism, 53 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1177, 1180–82 (2009) (finding that “[f]ailure,” i.e., death, “is a defeated 
expectation on both sides” of the physician-patient relationship). 
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Against this legal background, medicine developed unprecedented ways to 
save lives—although frequently the result was just extending the dying process 
of a patient.  The development of a new generation of ventilators, new 
treatments for victims of burns, newly effective kidney dialysis, and other 
medical advances, meant that those who would have died almost immediately 
could be saved—either to be returned to full health, kept in near-death limbo, 
or something in between.  The dramatic improvement of transplant technology 
at this same time created an additional reason to keep some patients alive (or at 
least aerated) when a generation earlier those same patients would have died 
quickly.  One result of the availability of life-extending technology and the 
ability to transplant organs was the development of the formal recognition of 
brain death, first in medical and scientific policy through Harvard’s Ad Hoc 
Committee on Brain Death,17 then through individual state legislation,18 and 
finally through the Uniform Determination of Death Act.19  The initial 
committee convened at Harvard Medical School to address complaints of 
doctors over the use of the traditional heart-lung definition of death in an era of 
ventilators and transplants.  Under the Committee’s proposed definition of 
brain death at least those who had all of the neurological attributes of death 
could be declared dead, despite their continued assisted breathing and 
heartbeat.20 
Medical concern over the essential principle that the first goal of medicine 
was to save life manifested itself in other kinds of cases, too.  While doctors 
agreed that it was appropriate to withhold treatment and let patients die under 
some circumstances, they complained that the law made them act otherwise.  
In some famous early lawsuits, for example—the Quinlan21 case in 1976 and 
the Cruzan22 case in 1990—family members, supported by physicians, sought 
recognition of the fact that the law did not require treatment under some 
defined circumstances.  The limited success of those lawsuits fed into doctors’ 
dissatisfaction with the incentives for end-of-life care created by the law.23  
 
 17. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of 
Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85 (1968) [hereinafter Ad Hoc 
Committee] (defining determination of death); see Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 87–89. 
 18. See Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 108–11 (discussing the “Kansas Statute,” which 
was the first attempt by a state to formally define death). 
 19. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT §§ 1–3, 12A U.L.A. 777–84 (2008). 
 20. This issue is not yet fully resolved in the law, of course, in part because of the different 
incentives and different interpretations of brain death that statutes provide physicians.  See Jason 
L. Goldsmith, Wanted! Dead and/or Alive: Choosing Among the Not-So-Uniform Statutory 
Definitions of Death, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871, 876 (2007). 
 21. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 22. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 23. See, e.g., Dorothy J. McNoble, The Cruzan Decision—A Surgeon’s Perspective, 20 
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 569, 569–71 (1990) (“Health care professionals had hoped that the 
Cruzan case would establish a constitutional guideline that would respect the personal nature of 
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The law of homicide, they argued, created uncertainties for those who took 
intentional acts (or withheld such acts) with the knowledge that doing so would 
likely result in the death of the patient.24  Depending on the doctor’s intent, the 
consequent death of a patient could constitute anything from involuntary 
homicide to first degree murder—a substantial disincentive when keeping the 
patient alive obviated any criminal and most civil risk for the doctor.  To avoid 
criminal and civil liability, doctors would just keep their patients alive—or so 
some said.25 
At the same time, doctors complained that they were not providing patients 
with adequate pain relief because providing adequate relief could be seen as a 
violation of common law liability principles, or even a violation of the criminal 
laws against the distribution of narcotics.26  We would like to live up to our 
ethical obligations and recognize that there are values separate from saving 
life, the doctors argued, but the incentives of the legal system make it 
impossible for us to do that.  We would like to practice good medicine, but we 
cannot—the devil law makes us do it. 
When doctors began to discuss the cases in which it would be appropriate 
to allow patients to die (and, maybe, to help them die), the legal policymakers 
were there to help support a developing consensus.  If the law made it 
impossible for doctors to allow patients to die, then the law had the potential to 
help those doctors and patients too.  State courts, legislatures, and, in some 
states, the people through the initiative process,27 set out to find a way to 
correct the problem that had resulted in the doctors’ complaints.  As Professor 
Johnson points out, the law has established four different ways to do this: 
 The first way is through education efforts.28  Legislatures set out to 
educate doctors and families about the practical limitations of 
medicine, and the fact that the law did not absolutely prohibit the 
removal of all life-sustaining medical treatment.  Indeed, in some 
 
these decisions and oust the state altogether from an arena that has traditionally, and 
appropriately, been reserved for the patient, the family, and the doctor.”). 
 24. See generally Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care?: Prosecutions Involving the 
Care of the Dying, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 308, 310 (noting that doctors may be criminally liable for 
“any act that grossly deviates from the standard of care and results in a patient’s death” and 
providing examples of physicians who in fact have been held criminally liable for professional 
behaviors associated with their provision of palliative care); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical 
Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. 
REV. 1, 49–54 (2007) (discussing how physicians who unilaterally terminate life saving medical 
treatment can be exposed to civil, criminal, and disciplinary sanctions). 
 25. See, e.g., McNoble, supra note 23, at 585–86. 
 26. Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain Relief 
Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 320 (1996). 
 27. See infra text accompanying note 85. 
 28. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1009–14. 
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states statutes were passed with the primary goal of simply articulating 
state policy and thus clearing up any misconception that the statutory 
or common law prohibited allowing a patient to die. 
 The second way is through immunity legislation.29  To more clearly 
respond to the notion that providers could be civilly and criminally 
liable for any unsaved patient, various right-to-die statutes were 
drafted to include provisions immunizing providers who acted in 
accord with the processes recognized in the statute for the removal of 
life sustaining treatment.30  The benefits of these statutes were 
extended to both institutional providers, like hospitals and nursing 
homes, and to individuals. 
 Third, the law also uses safe harbors.31  Safe harbors are another form 
of immunity, although the term “safe harbor” is more likely to be 
found in an administrative code, and the term “immunity” is more 
likely to apply in cases with potential exposure to tort liability. 
 Fourth, the law attempts to correct the problem through the 
elimination of asymmetrical incentives.32  Using this device, the law 
could take two alternative approaches to dealing with the incentives 
that encourage doctors to over-treat patients at the end of life.  Those 
incentives could be withdrawn, or other incentives could be added to 
counter them.  At first glance the second alternative may not seem 
necessary, but the fact that many legal provisions may serve many 
different purposes may make it simpler to add a counter-incentive than 
to remove the original incentive. 
These techniques—especially the last one—have been applied regularly 
with regard to end-of-life care.  If a doctor argues he cannot discontinue life 
sustaining medical treatment when that would otherwise be appropriate 
because it might constitute homicide, the law ought to create a new crime or 
tort that attaches to those who fail to properly discontinue life sustaining 
medical treatment.  If legal fear discourages doctors from prescribing adequate 
pain relief, the law can create immunity, or a safe harbor, for prescribing in 
appropriate cases, and maybe it should recognize serious damages when a 
doctor fails to do so.  As Professor Johnson points out, if law creates improper 
incentives, law can create compensatory (and thus proper) incentives, too.33 
 
 29. Id. at 1014–18. 
 30. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 31. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1018–22. 
 32. Id. at 1022–23. 
 33. Id. passim. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] END-OF-LIFE CARE 1161 
II.  FINE TUNING THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE CARE 
Since the first discussion of the appropriate role of law in encouraging 
good end-of-life care in the middle of last century, the law has reflected 
consistent reevaluation of the incentives that govern doctors’ behavior.  Each 
new legal effort is followed by a new combination of helpful and perverse 
incentives—some with foreseen results, and some with unforeseen results.  
Each new legal effort is also followed by a new round of provider complaints 
about the unhappy incentives created by the early round of law.34  Each time 
these new complaints are received, there is yet another iteration of law 
designed to maintain the helpful incentives and change those that lead to bad 
care to improve the legal environment in which end-of-life care is provided.35 
While each new iteration of law is the result of many inputs, the 
complaints of providers about how the law is working generally constitute an 
important source of information for policymakers.  When lawmakers have 
listened carefully (but skeptically) to providers, the next round of legal changes 
has been most likely to lead to better end-of-life care.  Essentially, the cycle 
goes like this: doctors complain that the law makes it difficult for them to 
provide end-of-life care; legislative or other legal authorities (like the 
judiciary) change the law; doctors apply the new legal policy and then discover 
that the new law creates impediments to the highest quality care; the law is 
changed again—and after each swing of the legal pendulum, the end-of-life 
care is marginally better than it was before, although still imperfect. 
A. First Try: Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney 
In the mid-1970s the first states reacted to doctors’ complaints about the 
legal incentives to over-treat those who wished to discontinue treatment.  The 
resulting living will statutes, passed first in California in 1976 and then in 
several other states by 1980, overcame the original problem created by the 
perverse legal incentive—to inappropriately treat in some cases—by allowing 
patients to declare what forms of treatment they would want later, when they 
become incompetent.36  Providers noticed that the new statutes were not 
 
 34. See generally N.R. Kleinfield, Patients Whose Final Wishes Go Unsaid Put Doctors in a 
Bind, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at B1 (providing anecdotal evidence of doctor complaints about 
end-of-life care laws in New York). 
 35. Cf. J. David Haddox & Gerald M. Aronoff, Commentary, The Potential for Unintended 
Consequences from Public Policy Shifts in the Treatment of Pain, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 350 
(discussing the steps taken to legitimize the prescribing of opioids for chronic pain relief and the 
reactions of physicians and public alike to the new public policy). 
 36. For a consistently reliable description of the development of these statutes, and full 
citations of the relevant statutes, see ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: 
THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 7.01, at 7-9 & n.12 to 7-11 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 
2008).  For a brief account of this history, see FURROW ET AL., supra note 10, at 294–95. 
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adequate to deal with most cases, though, because it was virtually impossible 
for patients to predict the circumstances in which they would find themselves, 
and thus impossible to order this care far in advance.37  A living will was 
valuable only if patients could predict with certainty what their condition 
would be and what treatment they would want. 
What could be done about the necessary ambiguity and, thus, limited 
utility of living wills?  Law to the rescue.  In the 1980s, listening to doctors’ 
complaints about the inability of patients to foresee their diagnoses and 
proposed treatments, many states enacted laws that recognized durable powers 
of attorney.38  These documents could encompass decisionmaking in 
unforeseen circumstances, because they were based on the patient’s 
appointment of a decisionmaker, not on the patient’s making of a decision.  If 
patients thought ahead and prepared durable powers to appoint agents to make 
decisions for them when they become incompetent to do so, it would allow for 
appropriate end-of-life care, even when the appropriate care was no care at 
all.39 
But the doctors quickly noticed that there were as few patients with 
durable powers as there were patients with living wills.  The doctors could not 
overcome the legal incentive to treat unless the patients and their families took 
some kind of action before the emergency arose.  What could be done to make 
these more effective?  If only patients knew of the values of these living wills 
and durable powers (which were combined into “advance directives” by the 
late 1980s), and if only health care providers would ask for them, proper end-
of-life care could be provided in accord with the wishes of patients.  In a rare 
federal intervention in this area, Congress passed the Patient Self-
Determination Act40 in 1990.  This statute—designed to address the problem 
reported by doctors who wanted to provide adequate end-of-life care—required 
health care institutions (including managed care organizations) to inquire about 
advance directives when admitting patients or conferring membership.41  It 
 
 37. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 43. 
 38. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 10, at 295–96.  See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, 
supra note 36, § 7-13 (providing a comprehensive list of state durable powers of attorney 
statutes). 
 39. The durable power movement was advanced by Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
in the Cruzan case, in which she pointed out that, “in [her] view,” the availability of a process to 
appoint a surrogate decisionmaker “may well be constitutionally required to protect the patient’s 
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.”  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 289 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 40. The Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to -206 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w) (2006)). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(2). 
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also required those institutions to provide information about advance 
directives, and to follow the state law, whatever it might be.42 
B. Second Try: The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 
That was not enough.  Doctors continued to complain that few patients had 
advance directives, and that there was nothing they could do but provide 
legally required but medically inappropriate treatment for those who had not 
appointed an agent or declared how they would want to be treated under each 
imaginable circumstance.43  In fact, doctors’ complaints about being forced to 
provide inappropriate treatment got more intense, and the apparent need for 
legal reform to allow and encourage physicians to act properly led to an 
attempt to use a new proposed uniform act to tie up all of the loose legal ends 
that together still created incentives to provide inappropriate end-of-life care.  
The American Bar Association approved the National Conference of 
Commisioners on Uniform State Law’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act44 
(Uniform Act) in 1994; this Uniform Act incorporated all four approaches that 
Professor Johnson discusses: education, immunity, the creation of safe harbors, 
and the elimination of asymmetrical incentives.45 
The Uniform Act’s primary purpose is explicitly to overcome the concerns 
health care providers expressed with regard to earlier advance directive 
statutes.  For example, it creates a default decisionmaker in every case by 
incorporating a family consent provision that allows those appointed by the 
patient, or family members of the patient, or, as a last resort, those who know 
the patient’s values, to make health care decisions for the patient if no one 
higher in the decisionmaking hierarchy is available to do so.46  In direct 
response to doctors’ complaints that living wills and durable powers of 
attorney did not usually result in actual decisionmakers upon whom providers 
could rely without fear of liability (because so few patients had signed these 
 
 42. Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A). 
 43. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELF-
DETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT 
EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 8–9, 14 (1995) (reporting that “[d]espite improved public awareness 
of patient self-determination issues” only about 10% to 25% of the adult population complete 
formal advance directives; that in 1993, an HHS-OIG study found that only 18% of hospital 
patients had advance directives; and that not only do advance directives lack clarity in the terms 
used but also that patients are often “not clear in their own minds what they want” because 
“[a]nticipating all the possible facts and variables is a daunting, if not impossible, task”); Pope, 
supra note 24, at 50–53, 51 n.284 (discussing legal uncertainty in the medical community 
regarding the physician’s ability to unilaterally terminate life saving medical treatment which he 
or she considers inappropriate). 
 44. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1–19, 9 U.L.A. 83–129 (2005 & Supp. 2008). 
 45. See id. §§ 7–9, at 117–22; see also supra text accompanying notes 28–32. 
 46. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 5, 9 U.L.A. 111–12. 
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documents), this statute created a list of default decisionmakers upon whom 
doctors may rely with legal certainty.47 
In this respect, the Uniform Act adopts an approach that several states had 
independently undertaken to address the problem doctors faced when there was 
no clearly identifiable health care decisionmaker upon whom they could rely—
the creation of a statutorily defined default list of decisionmakers, most of 
whom are defined by their family relationship to the patient.48  It also 
responded directly to medical concerns by providing that doctors could opt out 
of the obligations of the statute under some circumstances if their consciences 
required them to do so.49  While it also recognizes a much more limited 
institutional right of conscience, the Act is especially powerful in allowing 
doctors to do what they determine to be ethically required.50  Finally, the 
statute accommodates the many providers who were concerned that older 
legislation could be construed to require futile treatment.51  While what 
constitutes futile treatment may not be obvious, once it is identified, it is not 
required by this statute.52 
As Professor Johnson would have predicted, that statute provided for 
education, provider immunity, the creation of safe harbors, and the elimination 
of asymmetrical incentives to serve its goals.  First, the Uniform Act made 
education of a public just becoming aware of advance directives easier by 
declaring that no particular form is required, and that any form is likely to be 
legally sufficient.53  Thus, virtually all of the several kinds of forms available 
through health care providers, non-profits, religious organizations, and 
advocacy groups are legally acceptable, and different education sources—
sometimes hospital ethics committees or advocates for patients with particular 
conditions, for example—can all participate in educating the public and 
providers as to the requirements of the law.  The statutory form also uses the 
language of ordinary discourse and ought to be accessible to all; it does not 
require any legal or medical sophistication to draft an advance directive.54  
Further, it makes it easier to collect advance directives from members of the 
public by requiring no special signature form.  There is no requirement of any 
witnesses, no notary need be present, and no formal action is required to 
validate the directive.55  The statute also looks to educate providers about 
 
 47. Id. § 5(b), at 111. 
 48. Id.; see MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, § 7.04, at 7-51. 
 49. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7(e), 9 U.L.A. 118. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 7(f), at 118. 
 52. Id. § 7(f) cmt., at 119 (“‘Medically ineffective health care’, as used in this section, means 
treatment which would not offer the patient any significant benefit.”). 
 53. Id. § 4, at 99. 
 54. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 4, 9 U.L.A. 99. 
 55. See id. §§ 2, 4 & cmt., at 106. 
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individuals’ end of life choices; it requires that all advance directives—
including oral ones acceptable under the statute—be noted in the patient’s 
record.56 
Second, the statute includes both immunity provisions and safe harbors, 
although it is not always so easy to distinguish one from the other.  Both 
doctors and family members who make decisions under the statute are formally 
immune from civil and criminal liability as long as they act in good faith, 
meeting one of the greatest concerns of doctors.57  Essentially, the statute 
provides that if the Act conflicts with any liability provision elsewhere in the 
law, the immunity provision prevails.58  The law creates safe harbors, too, in 
several ways.  For example, it tells health care institutions exactly what those 
institutions must do in order to assert a conscience exemption.59 
Finally, in several ways the statute attempts to overcome the asymmetry of 
current incentives that doctors claim encourage them to continue treatment 
under all circumstances, even when it is inappropriate.  Most significantly, 
doctors claim that their fear of civil and criminal liability encourages over-
treatment.  In reaction to this complaint, the Uniform Act provides a context in 
which a provider would be as likely to be liable for over-treatment as under-
treatment,60 and the doctor would be fully protected from liability only if he 
could justify the treatment choice as the decision of the patient or the patient’s 
designated decisionmaker.61 
Furthermore, and perhaps more directly, the Uniform Act attempts to 
restore symmetry to the incentives shown to providers by providing for 
liquidated damages on behalf of a patient when a provider does not follow the 
statute’s directives.62  More significantly, as a practical matter, the statute 
provides for the award of attorneys fees for one seeking to enforce the 
statute.63  This creates symmetry in incentives to litigate, and it ought to cause 
doctors to avoid continuing treatment just because doing so restricts their risk 
of liability.  Following the adoption of the act, physicians run a risk of liability 
 
 56. Id. § 7(b), at 117. 
 57. Id. § 9, at 121. 
 58. Id. 
 59. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7, 9 U.L.A. 118. 
 60. See id. § 13(d), at 125 (“This [Act] does not authorize or require a health-care provider 
or institution to provide health care contrary to generally accepted [and applicable] health-care 
standards . . . .” (first alteration in original)). 
 61. See id. § 5(j) & cmt., at 112 (permitting a provider to require written authorization from 
an individual claiming authority to act as a surrogate for the patient, stating “facts and 
circumstances reasonably sufficient to establish the claimed relationship,” and which the provider 
might subsequently point to in order to establish good faith action for purposes of the statutes 
provider immunity). 
 62. Id. § 10, at 122–23. 
 63. Id. 
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whether treatment is withheld or continued, and they also benefit from 
immunity to this increased reservoir of liability when they scrupulously 
navigate only within the safe harbors defined in the statute.  What is more, 
private litigants now have the opportunity to use the law to encourage doctors 
to follow its provisions. 
C. Third Try: POLSTs 
From the perspective of someone who understands the logic perfectly, but 
who does not understand medical culture, the Uniform Act appears like the 
patch to fix almost all of the doctors’ complaints about the process of end-of-
life decisionmaking.  Although a wide range of providers were consulted in the 
development of that statute, the law has not been nearly as effective as its 
drafters had hoped—in large part because it assumed that the medical culture 
was more malleable than it has proven to be.  The Uniform Act creates a health 
care environment where end-of-life decisions are made by patients and 
families—where everyone agrees the decisionmaking locus should be—and 
not by doctors or health care institutions. 
The actual environments where these decisions are usually made—
emergency rooms, intensive care units, nursing homes—have been less 
amenable to a statutory change that put those outside the hospital staff in 
charge.  Hospitals are hierarchical institutions that demand immediately 
identifiable and reliable decisionmakers who understand their institutions.  
Essentially, hospitals (and nursing homes) were not ready to remove 
decisionmaking authority from doctors, who ultimately possessed it.  When 
those hospitable to patient decisionmaking began to understand why the 
Uniform Act could not fully succeed in their institutions, they began to look 
for a way in which the Uniform Act’s principles could be applied so that the 
decision would ultimately be in the hands of the doctors themselves.  Only 
through this application would these decisions actually be given effect in the 
institutions. 
Doctors’ complaints about losing their authority in the end-of-life 
decisionmaking process were addressed through the development of the 
physician’s order regarding end-of-life care, most commonly called the 
Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment64 (POLST) or, in New York, 
 
 64. See Susan E. Hickman et al., Hope for the Future: Achieving the Original Intent of 
Advance Directives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2005, at S26, S27–S28.  For an update 
on the adoption of physician’s orders with regard to end-of-life care and a complete list of 
resources relating to POLSTs, see POLST, Resources, http://www.ohsu.edu/polst/resources/ 
index.htm (last visited June 4, 2009). 
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the Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (MOLST).65  Also called 
Physician Orders for Scope of Treatment (POST),66 and, most recently, the 
Physician’s Orders to Permit Natural Dying (PO-PND),67 these orders address 
most of the issues that arise in the context of the advance directive 
contemplated by the Uniform Act, but they are ultimately identified as orders 
of the doctor, not directives of the patient.68  As a consequence of this change 
in form, arguably they are more likely to be carried out, even without the force 
of a statute behind them.  Furthermore, they clean up the uncertainties that 
might arise in the application of the Uniform Act by focusing on one episode 
(they are short term documents, but renewable) and dealing with do not 
resuscitate orders, medication issues, assisted eating and drinking, and 
sometimes other questions.  Most physician’s orders programs provide that the 
forms will be on some specially colored paper (usually bright pink or green) so 
they will be easily identifiable in the file—and so they will be formally 
recognized documents. 
The preparation of such a document requires serious and extensive 
consultation between the patient (who also must sign the document in some 
versions of this process), the patient’s family (who must sign if the patient does 
not have capacity to do so), and the physician (who must agree to be available 
to confirm all of the signatures).  These documents are not designed to replace 
the Uniform Act; rather, they are designed to make the decisions made under 
the Uniform Act actually effective by translating them from patients’ requests 
(as they were seen) into doctors’ orders (which will actually be followed). 
In some states, this has been a legal movement, and the validity of these 
physicians’ orders is recognized in statute law.69  In some states the documents 
 
 65. See New York Dep’t of Health, Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment, 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/professionals/patients/patient_rights/molst/ (last visited June 4, 
2009). 
 66. See, e.g., West Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-3(u), -25 
(LexisNexis 2006). 
 67. See, e.g., Stanley A. Terman, Advance Directive/Physician’s Orders to Permit Natural 
Dying, http://www.caringadvocates.org/AD-PND.PO-PND.php (last visited June 4, 2009) 
(providing information about PO-PNDs and sample PO-PND forms). 
 68. For a comprehensive discussion of these physician orders programs, including how they 
improve issues associated with advance directives as contemplated by the Uniform Act, and the 
process typically involved with executing a physician order document, see Hickman et al., supra 
note 64. 
 69. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4780–4786 (West Supp. 2009) (authorizing POLSTs); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-4512A to -4512C (2008) (authorizing the use of POSTs); MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH–GEN. §5-608.1 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008) (authorizing the use of 
“Instructions on Current Life-Sustaining Treatment Options” (previously “Patient’s Plan of 
Care”)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.17 (LexisNexis 2007) (recognizing MOSTs); W. VA. CODE 
§§ 16-30-3(u), -25 (recognizing the use of POSTs); see also Kathy L. Cerminara & Seth M. 
Bogin, A Paper About a Piece of Paper: Regulatory Action as the Most Effective Way to Promote 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1168 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1155 
are recognized through hospital policy, or even through custom.70  In either 
case, POLST, or POLST-like documents, demonstrate Professor Johnson’s 
theme once again: that doctors, at the cutting edge of end-of-life care, 
understand, as a practical matter, why current processes are not achieving their 
ends.  While we should view doctors’ complaints skeptically, we are able to 
improve the quality of medical care by acknowledging their perspective and 
reviewing their recommendations.71  Some advocates of the Uniform Act 
viewed doctors’ complaints about moving the power of decisionmaking from 
doctors to patients as nothing more than the doctors’ attempt to maintain power 
in an increasingly patient-oriented health care system.  Others recognized that 
the doctors really did understand what was required to carry out patients’ 
desires in real world settings. 
The doctors were in a unique position to see how the law really worked, 
which, of course, was not entirely the way it was designed to work.  In some 
ways, the advance directive movement had succeeded, but in some ways it 
would continue to fail because American health care institutions were not 
willing to listen to anyone other than doctors.  By listening to those doctors, we 
were able to craft a system that gave authority to patients in practice, through 
the device of formally returning authority to doctors.  Because the physician’s 
order movement was not one based entirely in law, it did not use the devices 
Professor Johnson described—education, immunity, the creation of safe 
harbors, and newly symmetrical incentives—as statutory movements had.  The 
consequence, however, is in fact the same—the creation of a form that will 
educate doctors as well as patients, effectively give doctors who follow it 
immunity as long as they stay within the safe harbors, and end the asymmetry 
of hospital incentives that now require following the last doctor’s orders even 
if they conflict with the patient’s legally expressed wishes. 
D. Fourth Try: The Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act 
Sometimes doctors can identify legal gaps that adversely affect care, but 
the law cannot act to fill those gaps.  The most recent statutory 
acknowledgement that our medical culture requires physicians to issue orders 
to provide for end-of-life care is found in California’s Right to Know End-of-
Life Options Act72 (RTKEOLO), which was signed into law in that state at the 
very end of 2008.  Because it has just become effective, it is difficult to know 
just what the consequences of the Act will be—but it was designed to 
 
Use of Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 479, 491–93 (2008) 
(discussing and comparing state statues that recognize physician orders). 
 70. See Cerminara & Bogin, supra note 69, at 486–88 (discussing states’ grassroots 
implementation of POLST or POLST-like programs). 
 71. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1031–32. 
 72. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442 (West Supp. 2009). 
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overcome problems in the culture of end-of-life care that were recognized by 
doctors who regularly engaged in that care.73  Unfortunately, there was an 
insufficient legislative majority in support of any particular resolution of that 
problem, and its resolution thus may have to await an appropriate judicial 
review. 
Ostensibly, the statute simply articulates the obligation of physicians to 
inform terminally ill patients about the end-of-life care options that are 
available to them when those patients request that information.74  We might 
assume that this was also implicit in the law of informed consent in California.  
Although the RTKEOLO bill was substantially amended in its journey through 
the California legislature, the original text was designed to protect medical 
practice in just the ways that Professor Johnson suggested such legislation 
often works: it explicitly incorporated as appropriate end-of-life options the 
very alternatives that had been the subject of legal ambiguity.  It was designed 
to educate health care providers, patients, and families of those options, and 
even in its final diluted form, it implicitly provides legal immunity to those 
practitioners who act within the limits—really, the safe harbors—identified in 
the statute. 
By its terms, the statute requires that providers inform terminally ill 
patients about their right to refuse or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, about 
hospice care (at home and in a health care setting), about their prognosis with 
and without curative treatment, and about the full range of palliative care that 
is available.75  Most doctors—and legislators—agreed on that part of the 
solution to the legal gap that health care providers had identified.  As originally 
drafted, though, the bill would have required physicians to inform patients 
about two forms of end-of-life care that some physicians thought were 
illegal—“voluntary stopping of eating and drinking” (VSED), which includes 
the decision of the patient to refuse nutrition and hydration by mouth and by 
medical means,76 and palliative sedation, which is the “administration of 
sedative medication to the point of unconsciousness.”77  In addition, before 
those sections were completely eliminated from the bill, the bill was amended 
to include the description of palliative sedation as an “intervention of last 
resort to reduce severe, refractory pain or other distressing clinical 
 
 73. See id. § 442 (historical and statutory notes). 
 74. See § 442.5. 
 75. Id. § 442.5(a)(1)–(6). 
 76. Assemb. B. 2747, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess., Sec. 2, § 442(g) (Cal. 2008) (as amended in 
Assembly, May 15, 2008). 
 77. Id. Sec. 2, § 442(e). 
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symptoms,”78  and it noted that “[p]alliative sedation is not intended to cause 
death or shorten life.”79 
The RTKEOLO legislation grew out of complaints by physicians about (1) 
the information that was available to patients making end-of-life decisions, and 
(2) in particular, the failure of many patients to be told about VSED and 
palliative sedation, options available to those patients.  Initially the bill was 
opposed by physicians who oppose VSED and palliative sedation, and who 
claim to foresee the next iteration of problems that would arise out of the 
application of the formal legal approval of these processes.80  The statute was 
successful in addressing one problem recognized by physicians under current 
law—the failure of the medical system to educate patients about end of life 
options generally.  On the other hand, the original draft of the bill, with its 
references to VSED and palliative sedation, included the clear message that 
both VSED and palliative sedation were permitted, and that patients must be 
informed about those options.81  Because these provisions were removed from 
the bill, these alternatives remain in legal limbo in California, and some 
physicians may remain reluctant to provide this care which others assume to be 
among reasonable and legally permitted medical alternatives. 
By defining and limiting the use of VSED and palliative sedation, the 
intermediate draft of the bill would have created safe harbors for providers 
who acted within those definitions.  For example, the statute would have been 
explicit in allowing doctors to order palliative sedation only when the purpose 
of that treatment is to relieve severe, refractory pain, and to neither cause death 
nor shorten life (assuming those can be distinguished).82  Any physician would 
have known how to navigate VSED and palliative sedation while staying 
within the safe harbor implicitly created by the statute, and thus physicians 
would have benefited from de facto immunity by acting within those statutory 
limits.  Similarly, the original bill would have removed the asymmetrical 
incentives that zealous prosecutors can impose on doctors who believe that 
their patients may wish to consider VSED or palliative sedation.  Physicians no 
longer would have been at risk of criminal liability if they recommended or 
carried out these options, and that risk, as small as it may be, is probably 
sufficient to discourage some doctors from even providing relevant 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See generally Kevin B. O’Reilly, California Law Mandates Discussing End-of-Life 
Options, AMER. MED. NEWS, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/11/10/ 
prsc1110.htm (noting physicians’ fears that the bill, as originally drafted, would lead to the 
legalization of assisted suicide). 
 81. See Bill Analysis, Assemb. B. 2747, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (as amended in 
Assembly April 24, 2008), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2701-
2750/ab_2747_cfa_20080502_154817_asm_floor.html. 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79. 
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information to patients.83  Unfortunately, as a result of the amendments of the 
bill, physicians still face uncertainty over the legal propriety of VSED and 
palliative sedation. 
With regard to the RTKEOLO Act, providers told the legislature about the 
ambiguity they faced under previous law.  It simply was not clear whether or 
not VSED or palliative sedation were permitted.  The law was asked to resolve 
this uncertainty.  The state legislature recognized the importance of telling 
patients of the options available to them at the end of life, and it recognized 
that physicians had not been doing so before.  It filled in that legal gap.  While 
the legislature also recognized the problem of the uncertainty surrounding 
VSED and palliative sedation and set out to resolve it, the legislature turned 
out to be as ambivalent about the solution as providers—and the rest of 
society—had been. 
E. A Note on Physician-Assisted Death 
While a discussion of physician-assisted death is beyond the scope of this 
brief essay, it is worth considering the application of Professor Johnson’s 
thoughts on doctors’ complaints about “bad law” to this area of law.  In fact, 
there has not been much fine tuning of common law or legislation providing 
for physician-assisted death, and doctors—who have been prominent among 
those who have supported and opposed physician-assisted death—have not 
provided consistent analysis of the few laws that exist.  The first statute 
formally permitting physician-assisted death, the Oregon Death with Dignity 
Act,84 became effective a decade ago, and it has since been the subject of a 
great deal of data collection and analysis.  Like the Oregon statute, the newer 
Washington statute was approved through the initiative process rather than the 
 
 83. The ambiguity faced by physicians in this area is demonstrated by the fact that the 
American Medical Women’s Association (AMWA) felt obliged to include a statement in its  
recent “Statement on Aid in Dying” within which the organization attempted to define the way 
out of the quandary: 
AMWA also supports the following practices in the care of terminally ill patients and 
maintains that these practices are not forms of physician assisted dying. 
 The provision of palliative care measures to alleviate pain even if the patient’s death is a 
possible side effect of the treatment. 
 The withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining measures as requested by a patient or 
surrogate thereby allowing the patient to die as a direct result of his/her illness. 
 Providing only supportive care to patients who voluntarily stop eating and drinking. 
American Medical Women’s Association, Aid in Dying, http://www.amwa-doc.org/index.cfm? 
objectId=242FFEF5-D567-0B25-585DC5662AB71DF9 (last visited July 13, 2009) (footnotes 
omitted).  Of course, the first bullet point refers to palliative sedation and the last to VSED.  If the 
status of these forms of treatment were well-established, such a statement would not have been 
necessary. 
 84. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (West 2003 & Supp. 
2009). 
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normal legislative process.85  More recently, a Montana state court has found a 
state constitutional right to obtain physician assistance in death, and that 
decision is now pending in the Montana Supreme Court.86 
Because none of the state law in this area developed through the legislative 
process, doctors’ complaints about this area of law have taken different forms 
than the more usual doctors’ complaints about law that has bad consequences 
on the practice of good medicine.  However, we can review doctors’ comments 
on new and proposed physician-assisted death statutes to glean the insights that 
doctors have on how such laws actually affect the practice of medicine.87  In 
fact, physicians’ arguments with regard to physician-assisted death, on either 
side of the issue, have been directed to what those physicians see as the real 
consequences of the existence of laws permitting physicians to assist in the 
death of their patients.88  Doctors are not so likely to believe that there will be 
very many cases of physician-assisted death, at least if it is regulated in ways 
similar to the way it is regulated in Oregon.  On the other hand, many 
providers have warned policymakers that the environment in which we 
provide-end-of life care will change in radical ways (positively or negatively, 
depending on the observer) if there is legal authorization of physician-assisted 
death.89  We may not have to choose between the complaints made by doctors 
who support physician-assisted death and those who oppose it; however, as 
Professor Johnson instructs us, we should listen carefully to the arguments 
raised by each side, and to the complaints about the current and prospective 
law that come from each side.  Doctors are not as concerned about the actual 
 
 85. See Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010–.904 (2008). 
 86. Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787 (Mont. Dist. Ct, Dec. 5, 2008) (on file with Saint 
Louis University Law Journal), appeal filed DA-09-0051 (Mont.) (May 15, 2009). 
 87. These arguments can be found in a number of different and inconsistent sources.  Most 
are summarized in MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, and some are expanded upon in an 
excellent account of what the future of the debate on physician-assisted death holds, MARGARET 
PABST BATTIN, ENDING LIFE: ETHICS AND THE WAY WE DIE (2005). 
 88. See generally Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public 
Towards Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 303, 303 (1996) (noting that physicians who support the legalization of physician-assisted 
death emphasize “the relief of suffering, individual autonomy, and patient’s right to be free from 
paternalistic state intrusion,” while physicians who oppose legalization argue that doing so would 
“represent a profound change in social values, have serious unintended consequences, and that 
any gains from accepting the practice are not worth the risks”); BATTIN, supra note 87, at 25 
(providing an anecdotal example of a physician who believes that legalizing physician-assisted 
death might compromise physician judgment in the “conditions of medical practice in urban 
hospitals”). 
 89. See, e.g., BATTIN, supra note 87, at 25 (2005) (discussing the concern that physician-
assisted death laws would lead to widespread abuse of the practice). 
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operation of a physician-assisted death statute as they are about the real 
consequences it will have for end-of-life care.90 
Doctors who support physician-assisted death, for example, do not argue 
that the primary benefit of the statute will be the few people who take 
advantage of its terms.  After all, only a few dozen people take a lethal 
prescription written under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act each year,91 but 
the statute has changed the practice of medicine in other ways, too.  Doctors 
who support such legislation argue that it will lead physicians to focus more on 
end-of-life care and provide better care generally.92  They point out that the 
very existence of the legal option of physician-assisted death will assure 
terminally ill patients that they are in control, and that they do not need to 
choose death now to avoid untreatable pain later.93  In fact, some argue, the 
existence of a physician-assisted death option may actually go a long way to 
create an environment in which terminally ill patients opt to stay alive longer 
 
 90. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 992–1005. 
 91. OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., DEP’T HUMAN SERV., 2008 SUMMARY OF OREGON’S DEATH 
WITH DIGNITY ACT (2009) (reporting that since the Act became effective in 1997, 401 patients 
have died using prescriptions written under the terms of the Act; and that in 2008, 54 out of 88 
prescriptions for “lethal medications” were used). 
 92. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill, Legal Regulation of Physician-Assisted Death—The Latest 
Report Cards, 356 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1911, 1912 (2007) (noting that legalization of physician-
assisted death in Oregon resulted in “more open conversation and careful evaluation of end-of-life 
options” between both patients and their physicians and patients and their families).  See also 
OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., SIXTH 
ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 15–16 (2004), noting that: 
  The availability of [Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS)] may have led to efforts to 
improve end-of-life care through other modalities.  While it may be common for patients 
with a terminal illness to consider PAS, a request for PAS can be an opportunity for a 
medical provider to explore with patients their fears and wishes around end-of-life care, 
and to make patients aware of other options.  Often once the provider has addressed 
patients’ concerns, he or she may choose not to pursue PAS.  The availability of PAS as 
an option in Oregon also may have spurred Oregon doctors to address other end-of life 
care options more effectively.  In one study Oregon physicians reported that, since the 
passage of the Death with Dignity Act in 1994, they had made efforts to improve their 
knowledge of the use of pain medications in the terminally ill, to improve their 
recognition of psychiatric disorders such as depression, and to refer patients more 
frequently to hospice. 
 93. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill, The Million Dollar Question, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1632, 
1632 (2005) (suggesting that simply knowing that they have the ability to end their own life, 
allows terminally ill patients to feel less “trapped” and thus “freer to keep going”); see also 
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING: THE CASE FOR PALLIATIVE CARE & PATIENT CHOICE (Timothy E. 
Quill & Margaraet P. Battin, eds. 2004) [hereinafter PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING]; Linda Ganzini 
et al., Physicians’ Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
557 (2000). 
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because they will be in charge of their own medical destiny.94  Some doctors 
tell us that permitting physician-assisted death may actually decrease its 
incidence.95 
Similarly, those doctors who oppose the legalization of physician-assisted 
death are not so worried about the actual implementation of those statutes, 
because those physicians know that the numbers of covert and arguably illegal 
physician-assisted deaths dwarfs the number that will be done, with much 
greater oversight, under a statutory scheme.  Instead, they oppose physician-
assisted death because they believe that it will create an environment in which 
those given the choice are denigrated by the very existence of the choice, that 
the right to physician-assisted death will become an obligation (for the 
disabled, for example),96 and that it will destroy the doctor-patient relationship 
by causing patients to see doctors as agents of death as well as agents of life 
and health.97  Physicians understand that the debate over the legal status of 
physician-assisted death is not really about those few deaths that will occur 
under those statutes, but about the effect of the statutes on other aspects of end-
of-life decisionmaking.  Perhaps we will benefit from their insights and 
complaints by evaluating how to institute a physician-assisted death statute that 
really does recognize the social value of sometimes devalued people, like the 
disabled, that does not denigrate those groups, and will still allow individual 
patients to control their own medical destiny, maintain control of their dying 
process, and have access to adequate pain relief.  Perhaps, in fact, that is what 
California’s Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act does.98  Perhaps we have 
been educated by listening—skeptically, of course, because doctors are also 
acting to protect their own values and resources—to doctors’ complaints about 
the law and doctors’ suggestions about how the law should work. 
 
 94. See, e.g., OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN 
SERVS., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 15–16 (2006); 
Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes About and Experiences with End-of-Life Care 
Since Passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 285 JAMA 2363 (2001). 
 95. See, e.g., PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING, supra note 93; Cavin P. Leeman, Letter to the 
Editor, Physician-Assisted Death, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1041, 1041 (2002) (noting that only a 
third of patients requesting physician-assisted death actually used it). 
 96. See, e.g., R.J. George et al., Legalised Euthanasia Will Violate the Rights of Vulnerable 
Patients, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 684, 684 (2005) (arguing that legalized physician-assisted death 
would not only create a “duty of therapeutic killing” for physicians but it also would “infer a duty 
to die” on individuals with disabilities).  See generally BATTIN, supra note 87, at 26 (noting the 
concern among physicians about the potential for abuse of legal physician-assisted death in 
situations dealing with certain “vulnerable groups,” including women, people with disabilities, 
and the elderly). 
 97. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, § 12.04(F) (discussing fears that 
legalizing physician assisted death would “undermine public trust in medicine’s dedication to 
preserving the life and health of patients”). 
 98. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law attempts to create a medical culture that will allow—or even 
require—good health care.  In creating this law, lawmakers should be sensitive 
to suggestions made by those who actually provide the care.  Although doctors 
and other providers may mistake or misinterpret the law, they understand the 
real world consequences of the law in ways that lawyers cannot.  The very fact 
that a doctor mistakes or misunderstands a law relating to end-of-life care is 
highly relevant to those who are charged with figuring out how the law should 
be changed.  Laws govern through their terms, and also through their shadows.  
As Professor Johnson explains, in crafting law to lead to good quality health 
care, policymakers should remember that health law is often most effective 
when it educates, creates immunities for providers, creates safe harbors, or 
eliminates asymmetrical incentives.99  Doctors are particularly helpful in 
guiding lawmakers to an understanding of what kinds of tools will be most 
useful under particular circumstances. 
From the original living will legislation to the advance directive 
movement, to the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act to recent statutes like the 
California Right to Know Act, Professor Johnson’s thesis is demonstrated 
particularly clearly by considering the development of law relating to end-of-
life care.  It has taken several legal iterations, each improving on the last, to 
create the current law of end-of-life care.  The improvement in each iteration is 
the result of our careful but skeptical attempt to listen to doctors’ descriptions 
of their experiences with the last round of legal developments. 
Lawyers are used to analyzing what laws do, but it is harder for lawyers to 
see the shadows those laws cast and to identify the effect of those shadows on 
the health of the community.  We will be better off if we depend on those who 
practice medicine amid those shadows to help us determine why the shadows 
are cast as they are, and how we could create ones that provide just the shade 
that we want.  We should listen to doctors seriously, albeit skeptically, when 
we refine the law with regard to end-of-life care. 
 
 99. See Johnson, supra note 1. 
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